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Introduction
All authors build upon the work of those who came before them.
Perhaps the most revered copyright scholar of the twentieth century,
Melville Nimmer, noted as much in opining that the musical and
movie West Side Story was, at some level of abstraction, a retelling of
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. 1 Were Romeo and Juliet protected
by the Copyright Act of 1976, the heirs of Shakespeare might well
have a case for infringement of the derivative works right.
Copyright owners marshal the derivative works right to exert
control over use of their works. 2 In such cases, courts tend to find in
favor of the owners and, thereby, deprive the public of new works. 3
This Article will engage in a close reading of the cases concerning
Gone with the Wind 4 and The Catcher in the Rye 5 in order to better
understand the degree of control asserted by copyright owners and
enforced by courts.
1.

4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright
§ 13.03 (rev. ed. 2012).

2.

See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 37, Warner Bros. Entm’t v. RDR Books, 575 F.
Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 1:07-cv-09667-RPP) (“While Ms.
Rowling has permitted some fan sites certain latitude to make use of the
material in her books, these sites are generally free to the public and
exist to enable fans to communicate, rather than to create an
unauthorized derivative work in order to turn a quick and easy profit
based on her own creativity. Ms. Rowling never gave anyone permission
to publish and offer for sale a 400-page Harry Potter ‘lexicon’.”).

3.

E.g., Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (finding for the plaintiff at the
conclusion of a bench trial and awarding a permanent injunction and
statutory damages).

4.

Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the Wind (1936).

5.

J.D. Salinger, The Catcher in the Rye (1951).
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The term “derivative work” is defined broadly in the Copyright
Act as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, . . . dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
. . . abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may
be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 6 Section 106(2) reserves to the
copyright owner the exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work.” 7 As such, the derivative works right is
the only right in the copyright bundle represented by 17 U.S.C. § 106
that overtly limits the creation of new works. 8 The other rights
articulated in § 106 limit reproduction, 9 distribution, 10 performance, 11
display, 12 and digital audio transmission 13 of the original work. 14 This
renders the derivative works right the most problematic of the rights
in the bundle because by limiting the creation and dissemination of
new works it arguably implicates the First Amendment and runs
counter to the purpose of copyright articulated in the Constitution,
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 15 This is so
whether one understands that purpose as providing incentives for
creation or dissemination of new works. 16
6.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).

7.

17 U.S.C. § 106(2).

8.

Many commentators have noted that given the fact that the standard
for infringement—substantial similarity—is the same in the context of
infringement of the reproduction right and the derivative works right,
the derivative works right may be seen as superfluous. See 2 Melville
B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.09[A] (rev.
ed. 2012) (“The best indication of the superfluity of the adaptation right lies
in the fact that those infrequent cases under the 1909 Act that invoked the
comparable right to ‘make any other version,’ generally also invoked an
alternative ground of infringing copying.” (footnote omitted)).

9.

17 U.S.C. § 106(1).

10.

17 U.S.C. § 106(3).

11.

17 U.S.C. § 106(4).

12.

17 U.S.C. § 106(5).

13.

17 U.S.C. § 106(6).

14.

Some commentators have noted that courts tend to conflate infringement of the derivative works right with infringement of the reproduction
right. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s
Constitutionality, 112 Yale L.J. 1, 50–52 (2002) (discussing cases in
which a claim of infringement of the derivative works right was asserted
and considered).

15.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and
the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 831, 894–99 (2010).

16.

See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) (“Evidence from the
founding, moreover, suggests that inducing dissemination—as opposed
to creation—was viewed as an appropriate means to promote science.”);
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This Article will demonstrate that copyright owners alleging
infringement of the derivative works right and courts enforcing that
right are often seeking to vindicate something other than an economic
right—a moral right. 17 Moral rights, in this context, refers to the
nonpecuniary interests recognized by many countries to be held by
authors of creative works, specifically, the rights of attribution, disclosure, integrity, and withdrawal. 18 These rights are seen as protecting
an author’s personality interests in his creation. 19 As such, it is
difficult to see how such rights are related to the utilitarian mandate
embodied in the Constitution. 20 Therefore, moral rights ought to be
see also id. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[C]opyright’s grants of
limited monopoly privileges to authors . . . [are] private benefits . . .
conferred for a public reason—to elicit new creation.”). The major
theoretical disagreement between Justice Ginsburg writing for the
majority and Justice Breyer’s dissent turns upon the issue of whether
the “Progress of Science” language in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of
the Constitution requires Congress to legislate to promote creation or
dissemination. See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles
Project: Directions for Reform, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1175, 1181
(2010) (asserting that copyright is intended to incentivize both creation
and dissemination).
17.

The issue of whether authors ought to be imbued with any exclusive
rights with respect to derivative works has been previously considered.
See, e.g., John M. Olin, Note, “Recoding” and the Derivative Works
Entitlement: Addressing the First Amendment Challenge, 119 Harv. L.
Rev. 1488, 1497–1501 (2006) (discussing the consequences of a public
right to recode).

18.

See generally Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study
in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 554
(1940) (discussing the development of the moral rights doctrine).

19.

See Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law
Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 Ga. L. Rev.
1, 4 (1988) (“The crucial link between the American right of personality
and the concept of moral rights is that works of art are expressions of
the creative personality of the author, and insofar as these works
continue to embody the author’s personality, acts done to them that
impair their ability accurately to reflect the author’s personality should
be actionable.”); Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and
Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 81,
81 (1998) (“Property rights, it was observed, are a means to protect the
personality interest or ‘personhood’ of individuals; this seemed especially
true with intellectual property rights that are draped over creations of
the human mind. Along these lines, personhood proponents could
understandably be found in the vanguard of ‘moral rights’ for
authors . . . .”).

20.

Roberta Rosenthall Kwall, The Soul of Creativity: Forging
a Moral Rights Law for the United States 24 (2010) (“[T]he
scant history of the Copyright Clause fails to reflect an explicit concern
with recognizing the personal rights of authors as an independent end.
On the contrary, the evidence suggests that the Framers’ primary
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distinguished from the pecuniary rights at the heart of copyright.
There is an argument, of course, that such rights are not worthy of
protection in the first instance. 21 But since courts enforce such rights
in the guise of enforcing the derivative works right, this Article will
presume that such rights are worthy of protection while arguing that
in the absence of Constitutional justification and given the personal
nature of moral rights, they should receive more limited protection. 22
To accomplish these goals, § 106(2) of the Copyright Act of 1976
should be repealed and replaced with a more limited grant of rights
subject to a compulsory license. 23 This new § 106(2) will protect a
copyright owner’s economic interest in derivative works. In addition,
to the extent that the moral rights of literary authors are found to be
worthy of protection, a new § 106B should be adopted. The moral
right protected by the proposed § 106B should not apply to works
made for hire, should be inalienable, and should be limited in duration
to the lifetime of the author.
While neither Eldred v. Ashcroft 24 nor Golan v. Holder 25 centered
on the derivative works right, both had implications for secondary uses
of copyrighted works. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held

policies were influenced heavily by the utilitarian goals of promoting
progress, safeguarding public access, and protecting the public domain
as the mechanism ensuring access to information and facts in expressive
works.”).
21.

See Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 263, 279
(2009) (arguing that the protection of moral rights may deter creation).

22.

See infra Part I; see also Thomas P. Heide, The Moral Right of
Integrity and the Global Information Infrastructure: Time for a New
Approach?, 2 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 211, 230 n.84 (1996)
(discussing recourse available through state moral rights statutes).

23.

The idea of a compulsory license associated with § 106(2) has been
suggested before. See Robert J. Morrison, Deriver’s Licenses: An
Argument for Establishing a Statutory License for Derivative Works, 6
Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 87 (2006) (discussing compulsory licenses
as the best way to strike a balance between removing the permission
right and keeping the right to receive payment for use). Moreover, the
Copyright Act of 1976 already includes compulsory licenses in other
contexts. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (providing for compulsory
licenses to create new versions of existing sound recordings provided
certain conditions are met). Determining whether the proposal would
pass the Berne three-step test is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
recent discussion of whether a compulsory licensing proposal passes the
test, see Jason Iuliano, Is Legal File Sharing Legal? An Analysis of the
Berne Three-Step Test, 16 Va. J.L. & Tech. 464 (2011).

24.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).

25.

Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
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that the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) 26 passed constitutional muster. 27 The CTEA extended the copyright term from the life
of the author plus fifty years to the life of the author plus seventy
years. 28 This effectively postponed the availability of works for use by
those wishing to create derivatives. In Golan v. Holder, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act (URAA) 29 which removed from the public domain works that were
previously available for use by secondary authors. 30 In both Eldred and
Golan, the petitioners alleged that Congress exceeded the scope of
authority granted to it in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
Constitution (the Copyright Clause) and that the statutes in question
infringed upon the First Amendment. 31 In both cases, the Court
deferred to Congress’s determination that the legislation in question
“serve[d] the objectives of the Copyright Clause.” 32 In Golan, the Court
also clarified its statement from Eldred that heightened First Amendment scrutiny would be appropriate only in cases in which Congress
altered the “traditional contours of copyright.” The Golan Court
limited the phrase “traditional contours of copyright” to the
idea/expression dichotomy and the affirmative defense of fair use. 33
While this clarification had been long awaited, 34 this limitation significantly curtailed the arguments available to parties seeking to assert
First Amendment challenges to new copyright legislation. 35
26.

Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
§ 102(b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827–28 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C.
§§ 302, 304).

27.

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222.

28.

Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act § 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302).

29.

Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A).

30.

Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878 (2012). For the Court’s discussion of the
impact of the URAA on authors of derivative works, see id. at 883.

31.

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193–94; Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878.

32.

Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889; see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198.

33.

Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890.

34.

See, e.g., William McGinty, First Amendment Rights to Protected
Expression: What Are the Traditional Contours of Copyright Law?, 23
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1099, 1100 (2008) (“Because the judiciary has
rendered toothless the Copyright Clause’s limits on Congressional
power, the First Amendment is the last hope for anyone arguing that
the Constitution places substantive limits on Congress’s ability to pass
copyright laws.”).

35.

See generally David L. Lange, Risa J. Weaver & Shiveh Roxana Reed,
Golan v. Holder: Copyright in the Image of the First Amendment, 11 J.
Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 83 (2011) (advancing the idea that
the Tenth Circuit’s decision upholding the URAA ought to be reversed
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In Part I, this Article will compare the cases concerning Gone
with the Wind and The Catcher in the Rye in order to focus the
inquiry on the derivative works right itself. While some of the existing
literature proposes deploying strengthened First Amendment arguments
in derivative works cases, 36 such arguments have proven largely
ineffective in copyright infringement litigation. 37 Other scholars argue
that fair use, properly applied, can function as a limit on the
derivative works right. 38 Unfortunately, this strategy has also been
unsuccessful. 39 Part I of this Article will undertake a review not only
of the opinions but also the arguments advanced by the parties in the
Gone with the Wind and Catcher cases to consider how copyright
owners and secondary users understand the derivative works right and
to determine which arguments appear to resonate in the opinions at
the district and appellate court levels. This comparison will serve to
develop the issues inherent in infringement determinations in the
context of allegedly infringing derivative works and to demonstrate an
attempt, on the part of both parties and courts, to vindicate a moral
right, namely, the right of integrity.
on First Amendment grounds, after the Tenth Circuit’s decision but
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision).
36.

See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 14, at 48 (arguing that courts ought to
consider the freedom of imagination inherent in the First Amendment in
making decisions with regard to derivative works).

37.

See, e.g., Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1105
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair
use are sufficient to protect any First Amendment interests not fully
alleviated by the ability to quote purely factual information); Ass’n of
Am. Med. Colleges v. Princeton Review, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 11, 20
(D.D.C. 2004) (“The First Amendment does not require that copyrighted
works be published or made available to particular persons”.).

38.

See, e.g., David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L.
Rev. 139 (2009) (arguing for a more structured rule-based approach to
fair use to preemptively clarify which uses are fair); see also Arlen W.
Langvardt & Tara E. Langvardt, Caught in the Copyright Rye: Freeing
First Amendment Interests from the Constraints of the Traditional
View, 2 Harv. J. Sports & Ent. L. 99, 139 (2011) (arguing for courts
to apply the fair use analysis in a way that is more sensitive to First
Amendment concerns); Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 395, 399 (2009) (proposing an administrative
agency to review copyright infringement and fair use issues); Gideon
Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 Va. L. Rev.
1483, 1488–89 (2007) (arguing for the introduction of bright-line rules
articulating that certain minimal levels of copying are per se fair uses).

39.

See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 146 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[W]e therefore reject defendants’ fair use
defense.”). For a cogent argument that fair use has never operated in
American jurisprudence as an effective limitation on the rights of
copyright owners, see John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph
of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 465, 492–502 (2005).
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In Part II, the Article will engage in a brief historical account of
the evolution of copyright protection in the United States by way of
tracing how the various changes impacted the protection afforded
Gone with the Wind and Catcher. In Part III, the Article will consider
the justifications for copyright in the existing literature. Part IV will
pose the question of how we might solve the problems associated with
the derivative works right and outline the existing literature on the
protection of moral rights in the United States. Finally, in Part V,
this Article proposes revising 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) and adopting a new
§ 106B. These revisions to the statute will serve three main purposes.
First, they will render transparent the personhood interest often sought
to be vindicated by copyright owners under the current § 106(2).
Second, they will act as a restraint on the power of copyright owners to
deny authorization for derivative works except in the limited circumstances where an individual author is asserting his or her moral rights.
Finally, these revisions will bring the derivative works right more in
line with the constitutional and historical moorings of copyright in the
United States.

I.

A Case Comparison: Does the Derivative Works
Right Allow Copyright Owners to Control
Derivative Uses?

Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind, first published in 1936
and the recipient of a 1937 Pulitzer Prize, is set against the backdrop
of the Civil War. 40 Its climax takes place in Atlanta during the siege
as General Sherman’s troops are approaching. 41 In 2001, Gone with
the Wind found itself at the center of a very different battle—a suit
for copyright infringement. 42 Nearly ten years later, J.D. Salinger’s
novel about a troubled teenager’s inner turmoil, The Catcher in the
Rye, would also find itself at the center of a copyright infringement
suit. 43
In SunTrust v. Houghton Mifflin, Co., 44 the owners of the Gone
with the Wind copyright alleged that Alice Randall’s first novel, The

40.

1937 Winners, The Pulitzer Prizes, http://www.pulitzer.org/awards/
1937 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).

41.

Mitchell, supra note 4, at 353–55.

42.

Complaint ¶ 2, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust I ),
136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (No. 1:01-CV-701) [hereinafter
SunTrust Complaint].

43.

Complaint ¶ 1, Salinger v. Colting (Salinger I ), 641 F. Supp. 2d 250
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09 Civ. 5095) [hereinafter Salinger Complaint].

44.

SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust I ), 136 F. Supp. 2d
1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
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Wind Done Gone, 45 infringed upon that copyright (this case is referred
to interchangeably throughout as “SunTrust ” or the “Gone with the
Wind case”). In Salinger v. Colting, 46 the dispute centered on whether
Fredrik Colting’s first novel, 60 Years Later: Coming Through the
Rye, 47 infringed the copyright of Catcher in the Rye (this case is
referred to interchangeably throughout as “Salinger ” or the “Catcher
case”). In both cases, the copyright owners alleged infringement of the
derivative works right and copying of characters. 48 In both cases, the
defendants answered by raising the affirmative defenses of fair use and
the First Amendment. 49 The Northern District of Georgia preliminarily
enjoined the publication of The Wind Done Gone. 50 Ten years later,
the Southern District of New York preliminarily enjoined 60 Years
Later. 51 Both the Eleventh Circuit and the Second Circuit vacated the
issued injunctions, but for vastly different reasons. 52 The resolution of
both cases would ultimately turn on the issue of fair use. 53
All of these similarities notwithstanding, these cases would come
to vastly different ends. Randall’s novel would go on to publication, 54
45.

Alice Randall, The Wind Done Gone (2001).

46.

Salinger v. Colting (Salinger I ), 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

47.

John David California, 60 Years Later: Coming Through the
Rye (2009).

48.

SunTrust Complaint, supra note 42, ¶ 3; Salinger Complaint, supra note
43, ¶¶ 70, 76–83.

49.

Answer and Affirmative Defenses at 8, SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d
1357 (No. 1:01-CV-701-CAP) [hereinafter SunTrust Answer and
Affirmative Defenses]; Amended Answer and Counterclaim at 1213,
Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (No. 09 Civ. 05095 (DAB)) [hereinafter
Salinger Amended Answer and Counterclaim].

50.

Order at 51, SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (No. 1:01-CV-701-CAP).

51.

Memorandum and Order at 37, Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (No.
1:09-cv-05095 (DAB)).

52.

See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust III ), 268 F.3d
1257, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff was not entitled
to an injunction because The Wind Done Gone had a valid fair-use
defense); see also Salinger v. Colting (Salinger II ), 607 F.3d 68, 74–75
(2d Cir. 2010) (vacating the injunction and remanding for a
determination of whether the plaintiff demonstrated irreparable harm as
required by the Supreme Court’s holding in eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)).

53.

See SunTrust III, 268 F.3d at 1276 (“[B]ased upon our analysis of the
fair use factors we find, at this juncture, [The Wind Done Gone] is
entitled to a fair-use defense.”); Salinger II, 607 F.3d at 83 (“Defendants
are not likely to prevail in their fair use defense.”).

54.

Press Release, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Settlement Reached Regarding
The Wind Done Gone (May 9, 2002), available at http://www.
houghtonmifflinbooks.com/features/randall_url/may9pr.shtml.
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while Colting’s novel would end up the subject of a permanent
injunction against publication or sale in the United States. 55 A close
examination of these cases teaches that very similar cases may come to
divergent ends because the fair use doctrine, relied upon by courts and
scholars alike to protect freedom of expression in the copyright
context, 56 is highly unpredictable. 57 The purpose of this case comparison
is to refocus the discussion away from rehabilitating the fair use
doctrine or, alternatively, strengthening First Amendment protections,
and to consider instead the contours of the derivative works right, how
it is deployed by copyright owners, and how it is handled by courts.
A. Arguments Propounded by the Plaintiffs:
How Copyright Owners See the Derivative Works Right

The arguments espoused by the plaintiffs in SunTrust and Salinger
are strikingly similar. They amount to an assertion that the copyright
owner ought to have control over all derivative uses, 58 even where the
copyright owner has refused to license uses such as the use in question,
as was the case in SunTrust, 59 and even where the copyright owner has
stated publically that he would never license any derivative uses, as
was the case in Salinger. 60

55.

Permanent Injunction and Final Order on Consent at 1, Salinger I, 641
F. Supp. 2d 250 (No. 09 Civ. 05095 (DAB)).

56.

In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003), the Supreme Court
stated, “copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations.” In discussing those accommodations, the Court went on to say
“the ‘fair use’ defense allows the public to use not only facts and ideas
contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain
circumstances.” See generally Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First
Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970) (discussing the conflict
between copyright law and the First Amendment).

57.

See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech
Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws,
Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42
B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2000) (pointing out the conflict between copyright law
and the First Amendment). But see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study
of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev.
549 (2008) (conducting an empirical analysis of all of the fair use
opinions over the referenced period and finding that the decisions are
not as unpredictable as the scholarship would suggest).

58.

Nothing in the statutory language requires such a broad reading.
Rather, the statute reserves to the copyright owner the explicit right to
“prepare derivative works.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006).

59.

Infra Part I.B.

60.

Infra Part I.B.
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Both cases began with allegations of infringement of the
derivative works right and of the copyright in characters. 61 Neither
complaint included an allegation that the copyright owner had
registered the allegedly infringed characters. 62 Rather, the plaintiffs
relied upon the registrations for the novels in question to demonstrate
that they owned valid and subsisting copyrights in the characters that
populate the novels. 63 In SunTrust, while the specific allegations of
infringement of the derivative works right and characters are asserted
in the “Facts” section of the complaint, 64 SunTrust’s actual allegation
of copyright infringement states, “Defendant . . . has willfully infringed upon the Mitchell Trusts’ rights by reproducing, displaying,
manufacturing, distributing, promoting, advertising and selling its
infringing work ‘The Wind Done Gone’ without the permission . . . of
the Mitchell Trusts . . . .” 65 This is a blanket assertion that amounts
61.

SunTrust Complaint, supra note 42, ¶ 3; Salinger Complaint, supra note
43, ¶¶ 70, 76–83.

62.

See SunTrust Complaint, supra note 42, ¶ 2. Salinger Complaint, supra
note 43, ¶ 1. The statute requires registration prior to pursuing a civil
infringement action: “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in
any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with
this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006). In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241 (2010), the Supreme Court held that
the requirement embodied in § 411(a) was not a jurisdictional
requirement but rather a claims processing rule. In any event, character
registration has seemingly never been required by courts. See, e.g.,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp.
1287, 1293–97 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that the James Bond character
is copyrightable and protected as expressed in sixteen James Bond films
despite the fact plaintiffs did not have a copyright in the character
itself).

63.

In Salinger v. Colting (Salinger I ), 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y.
2009), the plaintiff alleged only that Holden Caulfield is a copyrighted
character, infringed by the defendant’s work. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in
Support of Application for Preliminary Injunction at 14, Salinger I, 641
F. Supp. 2d 250 (No. 1:09-cv-05095-DAB) [hereinafter Salinger
Preliminary Injunction Memo] (“Salinger owns a valid copyright in [the
novel] Catcher. That copyright protects the character of Holden
Caulfield who pervades that novel; it is, in fact his story.” (citation
omitted)). For an illuminating discussion of the issues associated with
copyright protection for fictional characters, see Leslie A. Kurtz, The
Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 Wis. L. Rev.
429, and Gregory S. Schienke, Comment, The Spawn of Learned Hand—
A Reexamination of Copyright Protection and Fictional Characters:
How Distinctly Delineated Must the Story Be Told?, 9 Marq. Intell.
Prop. L. Rev. 63 (2005). See also Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One
X Prods., 644 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2011), for a recent treatment of this
issue by a court.

64.

SunTrust Complaint, supra note 42, ¶¶ 10–31.

65.

Id. ¶ 35.
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to accusing the defendant of infringing all of the relevant rights
granted to a copyright owner by 17 U.S.C. § 106. Since the
consequences flowing from infringement of any of the § 106 rights are
the same, this blanket assertion is, arguably, entirely appropriate.
The arguments asserted by the plaintiffs in these cases do diverge
in one notable manner. In SunTrust, the plaintiff asserted that
defendant’s unauthorized derivative work interfered with the
plaintiff’s ability to license derivative works as it had in the past. 66
Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that it had already licensed a
derivative work, not yet completed at the time of the litigation, the
completion of which was allegedly threatened by the defendant’s
actions. 67 To the contrary, the plaintiff in Salinger argued that the
defendant was interfering with “his constitutionally based right not to
publish derivatives of works he ha[d] previously authored and
published, i.e., the privacy underpinning of the Copyright Clause.” 68
It appears the plaintiff in Salinger was asserting the right of privacy
said to be inherent in the right of first publication. 69 At the appellate
level, this argument is more refined. The plaintiff relied primarily on
the right to privacy in arguing that he has the right to refuse to
66.

Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 2, SunTrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust I ), 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga.
2001) (No. 1:01-CV-701) [hereinafter SunTrust Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction] (“Because ‘The Wind
Done Gone’ is an unauthorized sequel, its publication will diminish, or
preclude outright, the ability of the Mitchell Trusts to authorize and
control future derivative works. Moreover, future publishers will not pay
for rights that Houghton Mifflin has taken for free.” (emphasis added)).

67.

See SunTrust Complaint, supra note 42, ¶ 15. The referenced sequel,
Rhett Butler’s People, was published in November 2007, despite the
publication of The Wind Done Gone six years earlier. See Stephen L.
Carter, Almost a Gentleman, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 2007, at G14 (book
review).

68.

Salinger Preliminary Injunction Memo, supra note 63, at 29; see also id.
at 8 (“While Salinger’s copyright in Catcher could no doubt be put to
lucrative use if he chose to author or allow an adaptation, sequel, or any
other derivative work, he has instead chosen—as is his right—not to
further exploit his copyright.”).

69.

See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
Harv. L. Rev. 193, 200 (1890) (“[The right to privacy] is entirely
independent of the copyright laws . . . . The aim of those statutes is to
secure to the author, composer, or artist the entire profits arising from
publication; but the common-law protection enables him to control
absolutely the act of publication, and in the exercise of his own
discretion, to decide whether there shall be any publication at all. . . .
[T]he common-law right [to privacy] is lost as soon as there is a
publication.”). For a recent case considering the viability of the privacy
interest represented by copyright, see Smith v. NBC Universal, 86
U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1579 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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create or license derivative works. 70 The plaintiff further argued that
failure on the part of the court to protect this right would abridge the
plaintiff’s First Amendment right not to speak and, thereby,
constitute irreparable harm. 71 While these allegations in Salinger are
markedly different, as a factual matter, from the allegation in
SunTrust, both amount to an assertion of essentially the same right—
that is, the right of copyright owners “to control the fate of their
works and characters.” 72
This right to control appears to embody the plaintiffs’ understanding of the essential feature of the right granted by 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(2). Some language utilized by the plaintiffs in these cases is
illustrative. In SunTrust, the plaintiff argued that in the absence of
70.

See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 47, Salinger v. Colting (Salinger II ),
607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878-cv) [hereinafter Salinger
Appellate Brief] (“Defendants never so much as acknowledge the
existence of Salinger’s right not to publish or his right not to authorize
derivatives. Both the right of first publication and the adaptation right
stem from one of the constitutional underpinnings of copyright law,
namely the right of privacy, i.e., the right not to publish.” (citing
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554
(1985))). It is important to note that Harper & Row had only to do
with the right of first publication and nothing to do with the derivative
works right.

71.

Id. at 50 (“Salinger’s constitutionally based right not to publish
derivatives is not the type of injury that can adequately be remedied by
monetary damages; it is exactly the kind of damage that courts
traditionally find irreparable. Indeed, this Court has reversed a lower
court for failing to issue a preliminary injunction in a case involving the
right not to speak, citing the many cases to that effect.”). See generally
David B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government
Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. Rev. 995 (1982)
(arguing that negative First Amendment interests should be driven by
interest in individual selfhood); Anna M. Tarushio, Note, The First
Amendment, The Right Not To Speak And The Problem Of Government
Access Statutes, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1001 (2000) (arguing that the
principal of autonomy protects the right to be silent); Robert A. Sedler,
The First Amendment Right to Silence (Nov. 9, 2007) (unpublished
research paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031505 (arguing
that the freedom of speech and the freedom of association together
create a right of silence). As an interesting aside, some countries do
recognize a moral right to refuse to disseminate one’s work. See
generally Carl H. Settlemyer III, Note, Between Thought and
Possession: Artists’ Moral Rights and Public Access to Creative Works,
81 Geo. L.J. 2291 (1993) (noting that European copyright law aims to
protect the moral rights).

72.

SunTrust Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 66, at 3; see also id. at 16–17 (“The Mitchell
Trusts, as copyright owner, have the exclusive right to authorize
derivative works and to control the fate of their characters.” (emphasis
added)).
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interlocutory relief, “[t]he Mitchell Trust will have been deprived of
its most basic right to create and authorize derivative works and to
control the way its copyrighted characters are portrayed.” 73 Similarly,
in Salinger, the plaintiff asserted that “Salinger has an absolute right
to decide when, whether, and how to resurrect the life that he
breathed into Holden Caulfield in another work and/or at some
different age.” 74 What is interesting about the divergence of these
arguments is that the plaintiff in SunTrust clothes its argument in the
language of utilitarianism:
If Defendant is permitted to publish this unauthorized derivative
work, the result will be that anyone could tell the story of “Gone
With the Wind” from another point of view or create sequels or
prequels populated by the Mitchell characters without any
compensation to the Mitchell Trusts. Nothing would have a more
dramatic or detrimental effect on the potential market for the
sequels and other authorized derivative works. 75

But Salinger’s insistence that he will never license a derivative of
Catcher renders his meager attempt to resort to utilitarianism all but
empty. 76 The plaintiff in Salinger went so far as to assert that
the harm to Salinger here is not solely (if at all) to his “pride”,
but rather to his copyright interests, economic as well as
“reputational”. The economic injury to the potential market for
derivatives, discussed above, is an interest Salinger is entitled to
protect. Amici characterize the nature of that injury as a
“moral right”, and discount it because U.S. copyright laws do
not take moral rights into account. It is specious to argue that
U.S. copyright laws and particularly the equitable fair use
73.

Id. at 31–32 (emphasis added); Transcript of Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order Before the Honorable Charles A. Pannell United
States District Judge at 27, SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (No. 1:01CV-701-CAP) [hereinafter Temporary Restraining Order Transcript]
(“The reason that the—the copyright holder has this basic right, this
right—the exclusive right to authorize derivative works is that that
permits him . . . to control the fate of his characters, to be able to
determine how these characters will be used.”).

74.

Salinger Preliminary Injunction Memo, supra note 63, at 27 (emphasis
added).

75.

SunTrust Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 66, at 27.

76.

See Salinger Preliminary Injunction Memo, supra note 63, at 26–27. The
memo attempted to focus the court’s inquiry on the “potential market”
rather than any actual plans by Salinger to use the Holden Caulfield
character. And it cited Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99
(2d Cir. 1987), for the proposition that “Salinger has the right to change
his mind. He is entitled to protect his opportunity to sell” his works.
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defense are not flexible enough to encompass some consideration
of moral rights . . . . 77

Given the current state of the law, these articulations of absolute
control, even in the absence of reasonable utilitarian motivations, may
well be accurate. The question here is whether copyright ought to
grant such an expansive right of control.
B. Arguments Propounded by the Defendants:
How Secondary Users See the Derivative Works Right

The defendants in both SunTrust and Salinger answered the
plaintiffs’ assertions of control with claims of fair use and First
Amendment protection for their secondary uses. 78 Their answers
advanced the notion that some uses of copyrighted works ought not
to require the permission of the copyright owner. In fact, in both
Salinger and SunTrust no such permission would be forthcoming. The
Mitchell Trusts would never allow the publication of a work that
included homosexuality or miscegenation. 79 Randall’s work breached

77.

Salinger Appellate Brief, supra note 70, at 55.

78.

The defendants in SunTrust asserted, among others, the following
affirmative defenses:
Defendant’s right to publish The Wind Done Gone is protected
by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. A
restraining order or injunction impeding promotion and/or
publication of The Wind Done Gone would be an unconstitutional prior restraint. . . . In the event the Court or jury finds
that The Wind Done Gone copies copyrightable expression from
Gone With the Wind, any such copying is a fair use of that
expression under 17 U.S.C. § 107.
SunTrust Answer and Affirmative Defenses, supra note 49, at 8.
Similarly, defendants in Salinger raised affirmative defenses:
Salinger’s claims for copyright infringement are barred in whole
or in part because [Coming Through the Rye] is a fair use of
[Catcher in the Rye]. . . . Any grant of the relief requested by
Salinger would infringe on Defendants’ rights under the First
Amendment . . . .
Salinger Amended Answer and Counterclaim, supra note 49, ¶¶ 99–100,
106. Note that the defendants in SunTrust also asserted the defense of
copyright misuse. See SunTrust Answer and Affirmative Defenses, supra
note 49, at 8 (“Plaintiff’s actions in bringing this lawsuit constitute
copyright misuse.”).

79.

SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust III ), 268 F.3d 1257,
1282 (11th Cir. 2001) (referencing Pat Conroy’s attestation indicating
that in negotiations with the copyright owner over the licensing of a
sequel authored by Conroy, the Estate insisted that there be no mention
of homosexuality or miscegenation).
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both of these conditions. 80 Similarly, Salinger had stated that the
story of Holden Caulfield began and ended with Catcher, and he
remained committed to that notion. 81 Furthermore, he refused to
license or create any derivative of any of his copyrighted works. 82
The defendants’ claims of fair use and reliance upon the First
Amendment, if successful, would have meant that the uses these
defendants made of the copyrighted works in question were beyond
the control of the copyright owner. The issuance of injunctive relief
would, of course, bear out the opposite meaning.
The tension here, between the plaintiffs’ assertion of control and
the defendants’ counterassertion that their uses ought not to be
controlled by copyright owners, is obvious. The question is which of
these assertions wins the day. It is argued by many, 83 and was decided
by the district courts in both Salinger and SunTrust, that this
question ought to be decided by reference to the freedom of expression
safeguards alleged to be inherent to copyright, namely, the
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine. 84 Examinations of
the opinions in these cases will demonstrate that the idea/expression
dichotomy is hardly engaged in any meaningful way. 85 Rather, the
80.

Id. (“In light of [the Estate’s stance against homosexuality and
miscegenation], the The Wind Done Gone’s transformation of Ashley
Wilkes into a homosexual, its depiction of interracial sex, and its
multiple mulatto characters take on additional relevance.”).

81.

In 1980, Salinger stated that “[t]here’s no more to Holden Caulfield.
Read the book again. It’s all there. Holden Caulfield is only a frozen
moment in time.” Salinger Appellate Brief, supra note 70, at 6.

82.

Id. (“Salinger has always declined [to permit adaptations of his
works].”).

83.

See, e.g., Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Copyright Under Siege: The First
Amendment Front, 9 Computer L. Rev. & Tech. J. 41 (2004)
(arguing that the emergence of new digital technologies should not open
up to criticism traditional judicial interpretations of the interplay
between copyright and freedom of speech).

84.

See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust I ), 136 F. Supp.
2d 1357, 1385 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“With respect to copyright protection,
however, the First Amendment does not license an infringing author to
trample on legally recognized rights.” (citations omitted)); Salinger v.
Colting (Salinger I ), 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“At the
Constitutional level, while the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment are intuitively in conflict, they were drafted to work
together to prevent censorship such that the balance between the First
Amendment and copyright is preserved, in part, by the idea/expression
dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

85.

See Defendant Houghton-Mifflin Co.’s Response in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction at 6, SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (No. 1:01-CV-701CAP) (“An ‘axiom of copyright law’ is that it protects the original way
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decisions are focused steadfastly on the fair use doctrine. This focus is
maintained in spite of the fact that the defendants in both SunTrust
and Salinger alleged that the issuance of an injunction would
constitute an unlawful prior restraint in clear violation of the First
Amendment. 86 Both district court decisions disregarded the asserted
First Amendment defense, evidencing a determination that either the
defendants’ use constituted fair use or constituted infringement.
C.

The Decisions of the District Courts: Trial Courts Construe
the Derivative Works Right as a Mechanism for Control

In both SunTrust and Salinger the district courts granted
preliminary injunctive relief. 87 In both cases, the courts’ decisions
focused not on infringement, which was summarily decided, 88 but
rather on fair use. 89 Both district courts held that the secondary uses
were not parodies and were not transformative enough to constitute a
fair use. 90 The language the district courts used in coming to these
in which ideas are expressed, but not the ideas.”). When the defendant
in SunTrust raised the idea/expression dichotomy in asserting a lack of
substantial similarity between The Wind Done Gone and protectable
elements of Gone with the Wind, the Court soundly rejected the
defendant’s argument, finding actionable substantial similarity.
SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1368. In Salinger, the only mention of
the idea/expression dichotomy is in reference to its role in preventing a
conflict with the First Amendment. Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 255.
86.

See SunTrust Answer and Affirmative Defenses, supra note 49, at 8 (“A
restraining order or injunction impeding promotion and/or publication
of The Wind Done Gone would be an unconstitutional prior restraint.”);
Salinger Amended Answer and Counterclaim, supra note 49, at 13
(“Any grant of the relief requested by Salinger would infringe on
Defendants’ rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States of America . . . .”).

87.

See SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1386 (“[D]efendant is hereby
PRELIMINARILY ENJOINED from further production, display,
distribution, advertising, sale, or offer for sale of the book The Wind
Done Gone.”); Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. at 269 (“[T]he Court
preliminarily enjoins Defendants from manufacturing, publishing,
distributing, shipping, advertising, promoting, selling, or otherwise
disseminating any copy of 60 Years . . . .”).

88.

See SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1370 (“[T]he court finds as a matter
of fact that the substantial similarities between the two works involve
actionable copyrightable elements . . . .”); Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at
254 (“Plaintiff has shown that there is substantial similarity between
Catcher and 60 Years . . . such that it was an unauthorized
infringement of Plaintiff’s copyright.”).

89.

SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1370–84; Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at
254–68.

90.

SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1381; Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 260–
61.
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conclusions demonstrates that the interest at issue here is seen as
something other than, or perhaps more than, utilitarian.
In SunTrust, the court’s statements during the temporary
restraining order/preliminary injunction hearing are illuminating.
Judge Pannell, in response to defense counsel’s argument that
issuance of a preliminary injunction would constitute an impermissible
prior restraint under the First Amendment, said:
Well, if you carried that—I don’t have any idea how many
copyright cases I handled on the Superior Court, but I handled
a lot of trespass cases. And I’ve had cases where a fellow would
just take a bulldozer and start across another man’s land
because that was the easiest way to get there and it would save
him a lot of money. And then when we got to court, the
bulldozer guy would whine that if we enjoined him from going
across the man’s pasture, it was going to cost him a lot of
money.
Well, we didn’t give him much truck on that argument because
it wasn’t his land to begin with, number one. Number two, he
was obviously a trespasser. Number three, he can just find
another way, and that is his tough luck. . . .
So, if your client has trespassed on their copyright, I don’t see
the balance of the harm to your client really coming into play,
because you are a trespasser. 91

This conflation of copyright with real property is problematic because
the consequence of treating copyright as if it is interchangeable with
tangible, real property is overprotection. 92 Said another way, treating
copyright infringement as akin to trespass upon real property
disregards the constitutional and historical framework in which
statutory copyright has developed and imposes the theoretical
framework surrounding real property in its place. 93 This conflation
ignores the speech interests at issue in copyright cases and the
inherent differences between real property and copyrighted works. 94
91.

Temporary Restraining Order Transcript, supra note 73, at 68.

92.

See William Patry, Moral Panics and The Copyright Wars
109–20 (2009) (explaining that the main difference between tangible
property and copyrights arises from ex ante physical limitations on
rights in the former and expansive, abstract ex post rights in the latter).

93.

Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1031 (2005) (“[F]ree competition is the norm.
Intellectual property rights are an exception to that norm, and they are
granted only when—and only to the extent that—they are necessary to
encourage invention.”).

94.

See L. Ray Patterson & Stanley F. Birch, Jr., A Unified
Theory of Copyright (Craig Joyce ed., 2009), printed in 46 Hous. L.
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As a practical matter, it gives the court a shortcut from infringement
to injunctive relief that is contrary to the statutory language and to
Supreme Court precedent. 95
The trespasser quotation taken from the transcript for the
temporary restraining order hearing foreshadows the court’s ultimate
decision. In the decision, the court resolved the tension between
copyright and the First Amendment as follows: “With respect to
copyright protection, . . . the First Amendment does not license an
infringing author to trample on legally recognized rights. . . . The
competing public interests of access to Ms. Randall’s work and
preserving a copyright holder’s ownership interests, on balance, favor
preserving the plaintiff’s copyright interests.” 96 That the limited
statutory copyright prevailed over the Constitution’s guarantee of free
expression seems to be of little moment. Examining the court’s
understanding of the degree of control given to copyright owners by
the Copyright Act may explain this apparent supremacy of the
Copyright Act over the First Amendment.
Although nothing in the language of § 106(2) of the Copyright
Act supports an exclusive right to absolute control by the copyright
owner, the district court in SunTrust seems to have agreed with the
plaintiff’s assertion that the right includes not only the right to
license or create derivative works but also the right to control
derivative works. For example, the court stated that “the licensing,
creation, and control over derivative uses is an important economic
incentive to the creation of the original.” 97 For this proposition the
court cited Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, where the Supreme Court stated
that “licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to

Rev. 215, 239 (2009) (“The property right that is copyright, then, is
necessarily a limited right, because copyright cannot constitutionally
inhibit the public’s right to know and learn.”).
95.

See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006) (concerning remedies for copyright
infringement). The statutory language is permissive: “Any court having
jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may . . . grant
temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem
reasonable . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court recognized
the permissive nature of this grant. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (“[C]ourts may also wish to bear in mind
that the goals of copyright law, to stimulate the creation and
publication of edifying matter, are not always best served by
automatically granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to
have gone beyond the bounds of fair use.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).

96.

SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. at 1385 (citing In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
918 F.2d 140, 143–44 (11th Cir. 1990)).

97.

Id. at 1383 (emphasis added).
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the creation of originals.” 98 In SunTrust, the Supreme Court’s
pronouncement is broadened to include factual situations, such as the
one here, where the plaintiff would never have licensed the
defendant’s use. This broadening is manifest in the court’s inclusion of
the word “control,” which appears nowhere in the Supreme Court’s
Campbell decision and, in fact, contravenes the Supreme Court’s
ultimate decision in that case, which held that certain derivative uses
cannot be controlled by copyright owners. Specifically, the Supreme
Court stated:
The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that
creators of original works would in general develop or license
others to develop. Yet the unlikelihood that creators of
imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of
their own productions removes such uses from the very notion
of a potential licensing market. 99

Copyright owners have the exclusive right to prepare and license
derivatives. 100 This right does not extend to controlling uses a
copyright owner would never prepare or license.
The district court’s issuance of injunctive relief also disregarded
Supreme Court precedent. The SunTrust court gave little credence to
the defendant’s argument that monetary damages could compensate
the plaintiff: “Allowing the defendant to prevail on this basis would,
‘in effect, make any copyright holder an involuntary licensor of the
copyright to any entity that could be relied on to pay damages.’ Such
a policy would undoubtedly weaken the integrity of a copyrighted
work.” 101 This statement simply cannot be reconciled with the
Campbell Court’s earlier assertion:
Because the fair use enquiry often requires close questions of
judgment as to the extent of permissible borrowing in cases
involving parodies (or other critical works), courts may also
98.

Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593). The Campbell Court cited the
statutory provision enumerating the derivative works right, 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(2). See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593. It is undoubtedly circular
reasoning to assert that the existence of a statutory provision evidences
the fact that this right acts as an incentive. It is much more reasonable
to say that Congress presumably anticipated that it will incentivize
creators. Without some empirical evidence that it does, the existence of
the statutory right is neither justification nor evidence that it provides
an incentive.

99.

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (emphasis added).

100. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006).
101. SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1384 (citation omitted) (quoting
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 329,
338 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
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wish to bear in mind that the goals of the copyright law, “to
stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter,” are
not always best served by automatically granting injunctive
relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds
of fair use. 102

The facts presented in the SunTrust case seem to be precisely the
circumstances the Campbell Court foresaw. The SunTrust court did
find that The Wind Done Gone “contain[ed] transformative parody
that criticize[d]” Gone with the Wind, but went on to hold that “it
does so no more than any other sequel to an original work.” 103 In
other words, although the court recognized the parodic elements in
The Wind Done Gone, it ultimately held that those elements were not
sufficient to constitute fair use. This is precisely the set of circumstances the Campbell Court envisioned when it stated that the
automatic grant of injunctive relief may sometimes be inappropriate.
The SunTrust court’s divergence from Campbell shows that it viewed
“the integrity of [the] copyrighted work” as primary and the
defendant’s asserted defenses—fair use and the First Amendment—as
secondary. 104
A similar dynamic is at play in the district court’s decision in
Salinger v. Colting. In the “Introduction” to its opinion, the Southern
District of New York summarily held that “Plaintiff has shown that
there is substantial similarity between Catcher and 60 Years, as well
as between the character Holden Caulfield from Catcher, and the
character Mr. C from 60 Years, such that it was an unauthorized
infringement of Plaintiff’s copyright.” 105 This summary determination
obscures the determination of which exclusive right in the copyright
bundle was infringed. It is entirely unclear whether the court’s
determination that there is substantial similarity between Catcher
and 60 Years is a finding that the exclusive right to copy the novel
was infringed or that, as the plaintiff alleged, the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works was infringed. 106 This is perhaps unsurprising
because currently the consequences for infringing either right are
102. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10 (emphasis added) (citation omitted)
(quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 1105, 1134 (1990)).
103. SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1378.
104

Id. at 1384.

105. Salinger v. Colting (Salinger I ), 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
106. Id. For a comprehensive discussion of the issues associated with
determining infringement of the derivative works right by reference to
the substantial similarity test, see generally Paul Goldstein, Derivative
Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. Copyright Soc’y
U.S.A. 209 (1983).
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exactly the same. But when one considers the constitutional basis for
copyright, it becomes clear that there should be some distinction
between the consequences that flow from copying a protected work
and those that accrue from creating a new work based on a protected
work. 107 Treating an author of a secondary work the same way one
treats a copier denies the fact that the secondary work is itself a work
of authorship and has the bizarre consequence of utilizing the
Copyright Act to restrict the distribution of a work which would
otherwise be protected by it. 108 It is difficult to understand how such a
result is justified in the context of the utilitarian objectives ascribed
to copyright. 109
Having made this summary determination of infringement, the
remainder of the court’s opinion considered whether Colting’s use can
properly be categorized as a fair use. 110 The vast majority of this
consideration focused upon whether Colting’s use was sufficiently
transformative. 111 Ultimately, this question is shorthand for whether
Colting’s use is one which ought to require the permission of the
copyright owner. In the face of assertions on the record that Salinger
would never license this derivative use or any other, the Southern
District of New York held that
although Salinger has not demonstrated any interest in publishing
a sequel or other derivative work of Catcher, the Second Circuit
has previously emphasized that it is the “potential market” for
the copyrighted work and its derivatives that must be examined,
even if the “author has disavowed any intention to publish them
during his lifetime,” given that an author “has the right to

107. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994)
(citing Leval, supra note 102, at 1132) (recognizing that cases
presenting something other than simple piracy require distinct
treatment).
108. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (“The subject matter of copyright as
specified by section 102 includes . . . derivative works, but protection for
a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does
not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used
unlawfully.”).
109. See infra Part III (discussing the motivating principles behind copyright
protection).
110. See Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 254–68 (analyzing plaintiff’s alleged
fair use in terms of the purpose and character of the use, the nature of
the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work).
111. Id. at 256–63 (ultimately finding a lack of transformative elements in 60
Years Later).

532

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right
change his mind” and is entitled to protect his opportunity to sell
his [derivative works]. 112

The court then went on, just as the Northern District of Georgia had
in SunTrust, to broaden the Supreme Court’s statement in Campbell
that the licensing of derivatives acts as an important economic
incentive to the creation of original works:
[S]ome artists may be further incentivized to create original
works due to the availability of the right not to produce any
sequels. This might be the case if, for instance, an author’s
artistic vision includes leaving certain portions or aspects of his
character’s story to the varied imaginations of his readers, or if
he hopes that his readers will engage in discussion and
speculation as to what happened subsequently. Just as licensing
of derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation
of originals, so too will the right not to license derivatives
sometimes act as an incentive to the creation of originals. 113

The court here merged the idea of economic incentives that copyright
is recognized as intending to provide with the more general idea of
incentivizing authors. 114 There is no question that the incentive
associated with the “right not to license” is not economic. Clearly, the
refusal to license or create a derivative work means that this right in
the copyright bundle is not being economically exploited. While
incentivizing authors in ways that are not economic may well be a
laudable goal, it is difficult to reconcile a right not to license with the
accepted utilitarian objectives of copyright.
In both SunTrust and Salinger, we see the district courts
broadening the Supreme Court’s pronouncements from Campbell to
encompass the factual situations presented. In SunTrust, this is done
by recharacterizing the derivative works right to include not only
creation and licensing but also control. In Salinger, it is accomplished
by broadening the idea of economic incentive to encompass the right
not to license or create derivatives, a right which plainly is motivated
by something other than economics. In both cases, the district courts
found in favor of the plaintiffs and issued preliminary injunctions.
These cases diverge at the appellate court level and, at least initially,
on the courts’ considerations of the First Amendment.

112. Id. at 268 (quoting Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d
Cir. 1987)(alteration in original)).
113. Id.
114. See infra Part III (discussing the motivating principle behind copyright
protection).
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D. The Decisions of the Appellate Courts: The Eleventh Circuit’s First
Amendment Decision Dressed Up in Fair Use Clothes Versus the Second
Circuit’s Focus on Irreparable Harm to the Exclusion of Considering
Defendant’s First Amendment Arguments

In both SunTrust v. Houghton Mifflin and Salinger v. Colting, the
defendants appealed the issuance of the preliminary injunctions. 115
Both defendants asserted that the preliminary injunction constituted
a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment, and both
asserted that their uses were fair uses beyond the control of the
copyright owner. 116 Both defendants prevailed on appeal. 117 Initially,
the SunTrust defendant’s victory appeared to be a victory for the
First Amendment. 118 Ultimately, though, the SunTrust court recast its
decision as one based upon fair use, finding that Randall’s novel was a
parody of Gone with the Wind. 119 In contrast, the Salinger defendant’s
reliance upon the First Amendment was almost entirely ignored by
the Second Circuit. 120 Instead, the Second Circuit, relying on recent
Supreme Court precedent, reversed and remanded for a determination
of whether the plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed in the absence
of preliminary injunctive relief. 121 The Southern District of New York’s
finding that 60 Years Later was not a fair use of Catcher would remain

115. Notice of Appeal, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust I ),
136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (No. 1:01-CV-701-CAP); Notice
of Appeal, Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (No. 1:09-cv-05095-DAB).
116. Brief of Appellant Houghton Mifflin Co. at 18–35, 39, SunTrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust III ), 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001)
(No. 01-122-00-HH) (“Considered in light of the First Amendment and
the transformative uses made by [The Wind Done Gone] of [Gone with
the Wind], the district court’s injunction is an unconstitutional prior
restraint.”); Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 26, 37–57, Salinger v.
Colting (Salinger II ), 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878-cv)
(“Stopping the presses on this book, even for a short period of time, is a
prior restraint that the First Amendment cannot tolerate.”).
117. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust III ), 268 F.3d 1257
(11th Cir. 2001); Salinger v. Colting (Salinger II ), 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir.
2010).
118. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust II ), 252 F.3d 1165
(11th Cir. 2001).
119. SunTrust III, 268 F.3d at 1272 (“We have already determined that [The
Wind Done Gone] is a parody . . . .”).
120. Salinger II, 607 F.3d at 76 (“[W]e need not decide whether the
preliminary injunction issued by the District Court constituted an
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.”).
121. Salinger II, 607 F.3d at 84 (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388 (2006)).
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intact. 122 Examining this divergence aids in understanding the varying
positions that persist with regard to the degree of control over
derivative uses understood to reside in copyright owners.
The day the SunTrust appeal was argued before the Eleventh
Circuit, the court vacated the injunction issued by the Northern
District of Georgia, stating, “It is manifest that the entry of a
preliminary injunction in this copyright case was an abuse of
discretion in that it represents an unlawful prior restraint in violation
of the First Amendment.” 123 But five months later the Eleventh
Circuit vacated that per curiam opinion and replaced it with an
opinion recasting its previously unequivocal free speech statement in
the guise of an assessment of the fair use factors. 124 That opinion cited
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s opinion in
Eldred v. Reno for the proposition that “[i]n copyright law, the
balance between the First Amendment and copyright is preserved, in
part, by the idea/expression dichotomy and the doctrine of fair
use.” 125 Of course, the D.C. Circuit had gone much further, stating
that “copyrights are categorically immune from challenges under the
First Amendment.” 126 It is little wonder, then, that the remainder of
the Eleventh Circuit’s substitute opinion was clothed in the
framework of fair use.
Although this new opinion from the Eleventh Circuit privileged
the fair use defense over the First Amendment, it is nonetheless clear
that the First Amendment concerns expressed in the prior per curiam
opinion remained present. The court said, “To approach these issues
in the proper framework, we should initially review the history of the
Constitution’s Copyright Clause and understand its relationship to
the First Amendment.” 127 In stark contrast, the Second Circuit, in
Salinger v. Colting, avoided the prior restraint issue altogether: “We
122. Id. at 83 (“More serious is Defendants’ assertion of a fair use defense.
And at this preliminary stage, we agree with the District Court that
Defendants will not likely be able to make out such a defense.”).
123. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust II ), 252 F.3d 1165,
1166 (11th Cir. 2001).
124. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust III ), 268 F.3d
1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
125. Id. at 1263 (citing Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001));
see Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375 (“The first amendment objection . . . was
misplaced ‘[i]n view of the First Amendment protections already
embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable
expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use.’”) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1984))).
126. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375.
127. SunTrust III, 268 F.3d at 1260.
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agree that eBay abrogated parts of this Court’s preliminary injunction
standard in copyright cases . . . . In light of that holding we need not
decide whether the preliminary injunction issued by the District
Court constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.” 128
The remainder of the Second Circuit opinion concerned itself primarily with demonstrating that eBay, which reversed the Federal
Circuit’s presumption of irreparable harm in the context of issuance of
a permanent injunction in a patent infringement case, applied with
equal force in the context of the issuance of a preliminary injunction
in this copyright infringement case. 129 In fact, the Second Circuit’s de
novo consideration of the substance of Salinger’s copyright
infringement claim begins and ends on the second-to-last page of the
opinion. The court noted for reasons of judicial economy “that there is
no reason to disturb the District Court’s conclusion as to the factor it
did consider—namely, that Salinger is likely to succeed on the merits
of his copyright infringement claim.” 130
While the defendant’s First Amendment assertions went largely
unheeded in Salinger, the Second Circuit did consider the First
Amendment interests of the plaintiffs in its analysis of whether the
plaintiffs had demonstrated that, in the absence of injunctive relief,
they would be irreparably harmed. 131 As to the asserted First
Amendment interests, the court said that “a defendant . . . has a core
First Amendment interest in the freedom to express himself or herself,
so long as that expression does not infringe the plaintiff’s
copyright.” 132 This, of course, harkens back to the supremacy of
copyright over the First Amendment observed in the district court
opinions in both Salinger and SunTrust. The court then turned its
attention to the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs: “The
plaintiff’s interest is, principally, a property interest in the
copyrighted material. But . . . a copyright holder might also have a
First Amendment interest in not speaking.” 133 The most obvious
128. Salinger v. Colting (Salinger II ), 607 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2010).
129. Id. at 77–78 (“We hold today that eBay applies with equal force (a) to
preliminary injunctions (b) that are issued for alleged copyright
infringement. First, nothing in the text or the logic of eBay suggests
that its rule is limited to patent cases. On the contrary, eBay strongly
indicates that the traditional principles of equity it employed are the
presumptive standard for injunctions in any context.” (citing eBay, Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006))). Further, the
court noted that the eBay Court’s reliance on copyright decisions
constituted further evidence that eBay should apply in the copyright
context. Id. at 77.
130. Id. at 83.
131. Id. at 81.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citation omitted).

536

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right

critique of the court’s assertion that the plaintiffs here have a right
not to speak, protected by the First Amendment, is, of course, that
the copyright holder is not being made to speak. It simply cannot be
sustained that the publication of 60 Years Later would be
tantamount to government compulsion to express a particular
viewpoint. 134 Rather, it is Colting, the author of 60 Years Later, who,
as a result of the issued injunction, is being made not to speak. This
critique is further developed by a review of the cited precedent.
For the proposition that “a copyright holder might also have a
First Amendment” right not to speak, the Second Circuit cited the
Supreme Court’s decision in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises. 135 In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court considered
whether The Nation’s use of relatively short excerpts from the
memoirs of President Ford to scoop an article slated to be run by
another magazine prior to the release of the memoirs constituted fair
use. 136 In coming to the conclusion that The Nation’s use was not a
fair use, the Court stated that “freedom of thought and expression
‘includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all.’” 137 The Court went on to say, “Courts and
commentators have recognized that copyright, and the right of first
publication in particular, serve this countervailing First Amendment
value.” 138 Even if this premise is accepted as true, the facts of Salinger
simply do not comport with the Supreme Court’s holding in Harper &
Row. Salinger had long since published Catcher, so any right of first
publication was properly exercised. Moreover, it is difficult to
comprehend how Colting’s novel can be perceived as a compulsion of
speech from Salinger. The Second Circuit’s ultimate statement that
“infringement of the right not to speak, ‘for even minimal periods of
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury’” is plainly at odds
with both the facts of the case and the precedent upon which it
relies. 139 The court firmly rooted its decision that Salinger has the
right to choose not to license or create derivative works and has the
134. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that a
New Hampshire statute requiring the display of the state motto “Live
Free or Die” infringed upon Petitioner’s right not to speak). The Court
held “the right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely
and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” Id.
135. Salinger II, 607 F.3d at 81 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)).
136. Harper, 471 U.S. 539.
137. Id. at 559 (quoting Wooley, 430 U. S. at 714).
138. Harper, 471 U.S. at 560.
139. Salinger II, 607 F.3d at 81 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373
(1976)).

537

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right

right, by extension, to control the publication of derivative works by
others in the First Amendment’s protection of the right not to speak.
And the court saw no need to revisit the specious argument that such
a right, which is clearly lacking in an economic basis, is founded on
copyright. The Eleventh Circuit, having found no similar First
Amendment protection for the copyright owners of Gone with the
Wind, went on to consider whether the Copyright Act itself
establishes such a right. 140 In his concurrence, Judge Marcus answered
this query unequivocally in the negative. 141
Marcus’s concurrence is notable for its treatment of the SunTrust
plaintiff’s admitted practice of exercising editorial control over
licensed derivative works. 142 Marcus viewed this exercise as an
attempt to “preserve Gone With the Wind’s reputation, or protect its
story from ‘taint’” and emphatically dismissed any role copyright law
may play in such an endeavor, stating that SunTrust “may not now
invoke copyright to further that goal.” 143 He stated his opinion on this
issue succinctly: “[I]t is not copyright’s job to ‘protect the reputation’
of a work or guard it from ‘taint’ in any sense except an economic
one . . . .” 144 Marcus took this a step further, generalizing to copyright
owners as a class, stating that copyright “should not also afford them
windfall damages for the publication of the sorts of works that they
themselves would never publish, or worse, grant them a power of
indirect censorship.” 145 Marcus’s concurrence, like the Eleventh
Circuit’s majority decision, holds that the plaintiff’s refusal to create
or license certain derivatives simply cannot be maintained by
reference to copyright’s utilitarian objectives. 146 Marcus’s lack of
ambiguity in this regard lends clarity to the fair use analysis that is so
often lacking.

140. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust III ), 268 F.3d 1257,
1276 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[SunTrust] has failed to show, at least at this
early juncture in the case, how the publication of [The Wind Done
Gone], a work that may have little to no appeal to the fans of [Gone
with the Wind] who comprise the logical market for its authorized
derivative works, will cause it irreparable injury. To the extent that
Suntrust will suffer monetary harm from the infringement of its
copyright, harms that may be remedied through the award of monetary
damages are not considered ‘irreparable.’”).
141. Id. at 1282–83 (Marcus, J., concurring).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1282.
144. Id. at 1280.
145. Id. at 1283.
146. For the majority’s in-depth discussion of the history of copyright in the
United States and its evidence of utilitarian purposes, see id. at 1260–63.
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II. A Brief History of Copyright
in the United States: A Study in Accretion
Salinger’s Catcher, written in 1951, will be protected by copyright
until December 31, 2046. 147 At the time of its writing, under the
provisions of the Copyright Act of 1909, Catcher would have been
eligible for an initial term of twenty-eight years and a potential
renewal term of twenty-eight years—a maximum of fifty-six years of
copyright protection. 148 Assuming the renewal term was exercised,
Catcher would have passed into the public domain in 2007, two years
prior to the publication of Colting’s novel. Gone with the Wind will
remain under copyright until December 31, 2031, although, at the
time of its publication in 1936, it too would have been afforded a
maximum of 56 years protection. It would have passed into the public
domain in 1992, nearly ten years before the writing of Randall’s The
Wind Done Gone.
Since the publication of Gone with the Wind and Catcher, the
copyright term has been extended twice. 149 Under the 1976 Act, the
copyright term in a work already in its renewal term as of the
effective date of the Act was “extended to endure for a term of
seventy-five years from the date copyright was originally secured.” 150
Under that formulation, Gone with the Wind would have passed into
the public domain on January 1, 2012 and the copyright on Catcher
would have ended on December 31, 2026. But Congress passed the
Copyright Term Extension Act, which became effective October 27,
1998, extending these dates by an additional twenty years. 151

147. 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (2006) (“Any copyright still in its renewal term at
the time that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act becomes
effective shall have a copyright term of 95 years from the date copyright
was originally secured.”).
148. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23–24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080–1081
(1909) (repealed 1976), reprinted in Copyright Enactments: Laws
Passed in the United States Since 1783, Copyright Office
Bulletin No. 3, at 73–74 (1973).
149. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304(b), 90 Stat. 2541,
2574; Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
§ 102(d)(1)(B), 112 Stat. 2827, 2828 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 304(b) (2006)). In addition to these extensions, nine interim extensions
for works copyrighted between September 19, 1906, and December 31,
1918 were passed between 1962 and 1974. See U.S. Copyright Office,
Circular 92, Copyright Law of the United States 141 n.7
(2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap3.html.
150. 17 U.S.C. § 304(b).
151. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act § 102(d)(1)(B).
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Before the writing of both Gone with the Wind and Catcher,
Congress had already twice extended the copyright term. Under the
1790 Act, an author was afforded a term of fourteen years with a
potential renewal term of fourteen years. 152 The renewal could be
exercised only if the author was living at the end of the initial term. 153
A little over forty years later, Congress passed the Copyright Act of
1831, extending the initial term to twenty-eight years with a potential
renewal term of fourteen years that could be exercised by a living
author, or a widow or child of a deceased author. 154
In addition to these term extensions, the scope of copyright
protection has also gradually increased over time. 155 Of particular
interest for this Article is the adoption and steady expansion of the
adaptation right. The Copyright Act of 1790 included no adaptation
right; it granted authors only the “right and liberty of printing,
reprinting, publishing and vending” their works. 156 It was not until
1870 that Congress adopted a very limited adaptation right with
regard to books. 157 In passing this legislation, Congress effectively
overturned decisions like the one in Stowe v. Thomas where the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the German translation of
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin did not constitute
copyright infringement. 158 The 1909 Act significantly broadened the
adaptation right:

152. Copyright Act of 1790 § 1, reprinted in Copyright Enactments,
supra note 148, at 22.
153. Id.
154. Copyright Act of 1831 §§ 1–2, reprinted in Copyright Enactments,
supra note 148, at 27.
155. “Scope” in this context refers to when the author means to make
reference to both the categories of works that constitute copyrightable
subject matter and the rights inherent in the copyright bundle. The
original Copyright Act protected only maps, charts, and books.
Copyright Act of 1790 § 1, reprinted in Copyright Enactments,
supra note 148. In contrast, the current Copyright Act protects “original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” and
lists eight non-exclusive categories of copyrightable works: (1) literary
works, (2) musical works, (3) dramatic works, (4) pantomimes and
choreographic works, (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, (6)
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, (7) sound recordings, and
(8) architectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
156. Copyright Act of 1790 § 1, reprinted in Copyright Enactments,
supra note 148, at 22.
157. Copyright Act of 1870 § 86, reprinted in Copyright Enactments,
supra note 148, at 37 (“authors may reserve the right to dramatize or to
translate their own works.”).
158. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).

540

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right
To translate the copyrighted work into other languages or
dialects, or make any other version thereof, if it be a literary
work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work; to convert it
into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama; to
arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute,
and finish it if it be a model or design for a work of art . . . . 159

The 1976 Act again considerably expanded the adaptation right,
introducing the term “derivative work” into copyright’s statutory
scheme for the first time. 160 Under the 1976 Act, copyright holders
have the exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work,” 161 and the term “derivative work” is broadly
defined as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as
a translation, . . . dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, . . . abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 162 This steady growth
of the adaptation right is the reason the SunTrust and Salinger
plaintiffs can utilize the current derivative works right to argue that
they are entitled to control all derivative uses during the copyright
term. The current broad scope of the adaptation right is why the
plaintiffs can refuse to deal and, as such, it begs the question of
whether the current right is in line with the historical and
constitutional purposes of copyright. 163

159. Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(b), reprinted in Copyright Enactments,
supra note 149, at 64.
160. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 106(2), 90 Stat. 2541, 2546
(codified as 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006)); Pamela Samuelson, The Quest
for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative Work Right, 101 Geo.
L.J.
(forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript
at
2),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2138479.
161. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
162. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
163. See Rubenfeld, supra note 14, at 53–54 (arguing that the broad
derivative works right conflicts with the First Amendment by
suppressing acts of imagination).

541

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right

III. In Search of a Motivating Principle:
Why Do We Protect Copyright and How Does This
Inform Our Understanding of the Appropriate
Contours of the Derivative Works Right?
Understanding why copyright is protected is necessary to
understand the appropriate parameters of copyright protection. The
reasons for protecting copyright are multifaceted and nuanced. 164 In
both the cases and the scholarship, such varied justifications as
utilitarianism and personhood are proffered. 165 The utilitarian
argument posits that the protection of copyright serves the public
good by incentivizing creators who enrich the public domain. 166
Personhood theory asserts that creative works are an expression of the
author’s personality, and, therefore, the author’s interest in the work
is more than pecuniary—it is dignitary. 167 In Europe, personhood
theory is often asserted as the theoretical basis for moral rights. 168
164. See generally Samuel E. Trosow, The Illusive Search for Justificatory
Theories: Copyright, Commodification and Capital, 16 Can. J.L. &
Jurisprudence 217 (2003) (discussing the traditional philosophical
justifications underlying copyrights and their consistency with modern
copyright expansion).
165. William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in New Essays in
the Legal and Political Theory of Property 168 (Stephen R.
Munzer ed., 2001).
166. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The copyright law,
like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration. . . . The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); L. Ray Patterson
& Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’
View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section
8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 Emory L.J. 909 (2003)
(arguing that the Founders viewed the Copyright Clause as regulatory
rather than proprietary and advancing the policies of promoting
learning, providing public access, and protecting the public domain).
167. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976)
(reversing the district court’s denial of injunctive relief and finding that
the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claims including a claim that
defendant’s editing of their work constituted actionable mutilation of
the work); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
Stan. L. Rev. 957, 1014 n.202 (1982) (mentioning the development of
the droit moral (moral right) claim aimed at giving artists the right to
protect their works from alteration and destruction).
168. Kwall, supra note 20, at 5 (“In other countries, the intrinsic dimension
of the creative process is recognized independently of the external
commodity through moral rights laws that protect the personal, as
opposed to the economic, rights of authors.”).
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In addition to utilitarianism and personhood theory, the theory
that copyright serves to reward authors for their labor is still
occasionally referenced by courts. Although the Supreme Court
soundly rejected this theory in 1991 in Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Co., 169 the Court’s recent decision in Golan v.
Holder, at least arguably, breathed new life into this theory. The
Golan Court said that the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 170 gave
authors “nothing more than the benefit of their labors during
whatever time remains before the normal copyright term expires.” 171
Finally, the idea that copyright is protected because it is property
tends to make its way into decisions as well. 172 But this fails to
advance the discussion because it does not explain what property is or
why we protect it. Property is itself a legal regime in search of a
motivating principle. 173 This question has been addressed by a long
line of scholars who have come to diverse conclusions, including (1)
property protects that which one takes control of by investing one’s
labor into it 174 and (2) personal property exists to maximize the
wealth of society. 175 Margaret Jane Radin is known for her personality
theory of property, which seeks to justify property rights in the first
instance and to delineate circumstances in which certain property
interests should be privileged over others. 176 In yet another attempt to
justify the protection of personal property, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.,
in an oft-cited passage, said:

169. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but
‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
170. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat.
4809, 4976 (1994) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 104A).
171. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 893 (2012).
172. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 94–95 (2d Cir.
1987) (recognizing that owners of copyrights for unpublished materials
nonetheless hold literary property rights).
173. See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, On Private Property 89–104
(2007) (discussing the various rationales and tensions underlying
property as a concept).
174. See, e.g., Richard Schlatter, Private Property (1951) (reviewing
the theoretical history of property and suggesting that labor theory
persists in both socialist and capitalist economies).
175. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am.
Econ. Rev. 347, 350 (1967) (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize
externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the
cost of internalization.”).
176. See generally Radin, supra note 167.

543

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right
It is in the nature of man’s mind. A thing which you have
enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property
or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away
without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself,
however you came by it. The law can ask no better justification
than the deepest instincts of man. 177

As noted above, each of these theories has a corollary in the
intellectual property literature. While the utilitarian theory has
predominated the discourse, 178 this Article engages the idea that
justifications for copyright are more nuanced 179 and, moreover, that
the touchstone for our copyright policy ought to always be the
Constitution. 180
Getting back to the historical beginnings of copyright in this
country requires that we acknowledge that the Copyright Act of 1976
represents an exercise of Congress’s limited powers as vested by the
Constitution. 181 The Copyright Clause of the Constitution reads: “The
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” 182 Along with the Supreme Court in both Eldred v.
Ashcroft and Golan v. Holder, a great many scholars have considered
whether the current iteration of the Copyright Act is in keeping with
the Constitution’s directive. 183 The purpose of this Article is much less
ambitious. It is to utilize this constitutional framework as I consider
the problems presented by the derivative works right as demonstrated
by the comparison of the Gone with the Wind case to the Catcher
case. The difference in the outcomes of these two cases demonstrates
that the degree of protection copyright affords tends to defy
predictability. A better understanding of why we protect copyright
will assist in determining how we ought to protect copyright.
177. O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 477 (1897).
178. Kwall, supra note 20, at 23.
179. See generally Alfred C. Yen, The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright
Theory, 10 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 423 (1992) (calling for greater
incorporation of moral right rationales into copyright law while
preserving aspects of the utilitarian economic model).
180. Patterson & Birch, supra note 94, at 258.
181. See id. at 241–79 (detailing both the historical underpinnings of the
Copyright Clause and the structure of the Copyright Act of 1976).
182. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8.
183. See, e.g., Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That—A Reluctant (and
Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of
Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 595
(1996) (suggesting that a new constitutional framework is needed to
combat copyright expansion by the courts and legislature).
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While utilitarianism is often identified as the predominant theory
underlying the American system of copyright, there is no question
that the other theories are also deployed by parties and referenced by
courts. There is a great deal of scholarship that longs for copyright’s
return to its utilitarian beginnings. 184 Utilitarianism, while important,
is not and cannot be the sole justification for protecting an author’s
interest in his or her creative works. 185 Rather, as seen in the case
comparison above, the way that the derivative works right is deployed
by copyright owners and understood by many courts demonstrates
the intuitive appeal of moral rights concepts. 186 It follows that the
appropriate way to vindicate such a right is through legislative
protection rather than attempting to protect it within the guise of
rights that make up part of the copyright bundle. Therefore, if we
maintain that the copyright bundle represented by 17 U.S.C. § 106
ought to be directed at the protection of a copyright owner’s
economic rights and, therefore, justified by utilitarian concepts, the
derivative works right in its current form is unjustifiable and should
be repealed and replaced with a much more limited adaptation right.
Further, if we accept that an author’s moral right of integrity ought
to be protected, the statute should provide that protection
transparently and in a more limited fashion.

IV. How Do We Solve the Problem of the
Derivative Works Right?
A.

What Is the Problem of the Derivative Works Right?

Much has been written about the problems presented by the
expansive definition of the term “derivative work” in the Copyright
Act of 1976. 187 Succinctly, the major contentions are that the
derivative works right (1) places the Copyright Act in direct conflict
with the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause of the

184. See, e.g., Patterson & Birch, supra note 94, at 392 (“[T]he
communications revolution . . . requires a return to fundamentals. . . .
[C]opyright has only one purpose: to promote learning. But it has
multiple functions to fulfill that purpose: to encourage the creation,
dissemination, and use of learning materials.”).
185. See Madhavi Sunder, IP 3, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 257, 263 (2006)
(“[T]raditional law and economics analysis fails to capture fully the
struggles at the heart of . . . intellectual property law conflicts.”); Yen,
supra note 179 (noting the importance of combining the utilitarian
economic model with other justifications for copyright).
186. See supra Part I.
187. See, e.g., Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 Brook.
L. Rev. 1213, 1218–32 (1997) (noting problems of interpretation).
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Constitution, 188 (2) undercuts the idea/expression dichotomy, 189 and
(3) inserts uncertainty on the part of secondary users in light of the
fact that the vast majority of derivative works cases are decided on
the basis of the notoriously unpredictable fair use doctrine. 190 The
statutory definition of “derivative work” is so expansive that,
arguably, it unhinges copyright from its constitutional and historical
moorings.
It has long been asserted that the statutory monopoly of
copyright is held in check by two principles inherent in copyright law:
the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine. 191 The
idea/expression dichotomy is the principle that copyright does not
protect the ideas embodied in copyrightable works but rather the
expression in which those ideas are conveyed. 192 The idea/expression
188. See Christina Bohannon, Taming the Derivative Works Right: A Modest
Proposal for Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12
Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 669, 689 (2010) (“The derivative works
right demands greater First Amendment scrutiny because it prohibits
speaking as well as copying.”); John M. Newman, Note, Holden
Caulfield Grows Up: Salinger v. Colting, the Promotion-of-Progress
Requirement, and Market Failure in a Derivative-Works Regime, 96
Iowa L. Rev. 737, 747 (2011) (noting the clash between copyright and
the First Amendment).
189. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Harry Potter, Tanya Grotter, and the
Copyright Derivative Work, 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 17, 23 (2006) (noting that
courts sometimes mistakenly disregard this dichotomy).
190. See Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won’t Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and
Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 79, 88 (1991)
(referring to the nebulous character of the fair use doctrine).
191. See Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and the Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180,
1203–04 (1970) (arguing that copyright is held in check by the
idea/expression dichotomy and also positing that the limited duration of
copyright is a factor in checking the copyright monopoly). It is
important to note that at the time Nimmer was writing the copyright
term was twenty-eight years with a potential renewal term of twentyeight years. Id. at 1194.
192. The idea/expression dichotomy was first recognized by the Supreme
Court in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1880), which noted that the
“essence” of the work—and that part of it that copyright protects—lies
in its “statement.” This doctrine, like many other copyright doctrines,
comes to American jurisprudence from England. The late eighteenthcentury cases of Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 229; 4
Burr. 2303, 2355 (Yates J., dissenting), and Donaldson v. Beckett,
(1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 840; 2 Brown 129, 135, are noted as the
basis of doctrine in English jurisprudence. Like the fair use doctrine,
idea/expression was first codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2006). For a full explication of the history of the doctrine
and how it functions in American jurisprudence, see Edward Samuels,
The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 Tenn. L. Rev.
321, 325 (1989).
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dichotomy is codified in the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 193
The fair use doctrine was originally a judge-made privilege allowing
uses of copyrighted works in those instances in which allowing the use
would further the purposes of copyright. 194 The fair use doctrine was
codified for the first time in the 1976 Act at 17 U.S.C. § 107. 195 The
expansive definition of the derivative works right provided in the 1976
Act and, more specifically, the way that right is utilized by parties
and understood by some courts, calls into question the longstanding
notion that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine can
properly contain the copyright monopoly.
The argument advanced here is that the derivative works right, as
it is currently deployed and understood, cannot be justified by the
193. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (“In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work.”).
194. The doctrine of “fair abridgement” was recognized in England as early
as 1761 in the case of Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270
(K.B.) 271. “Fair abridgement” was imported into American
jurisprudence in the case of Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345, 348
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). The terminology “fair use” entered
American jurisprudence in Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1869) (No. 8136). See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 n.27 (1984) (describing the history of
the fair use doctrine in American case law).
195. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006):
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include —
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the
above factors.
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accepted utilitarian justifications for copyright law. To the extent
that the interest intuitively protected by the derivative works right is
deserving of protection, a separate justification and different
parameters are required.
The idea that the derivative works right is justified by utilitarian
considerations has been advanced 196 and refuted. 197 Any claim that the
derivative works right ought to be protected because it is property
fails for all of the reasons that the argument to protect copyright
because it is property fails. 198 Specifically, the derivative works right is
unlike any right we comprehend as a part of the bundle of rights
associated with tangible property. As demonstrated above, the right
to an injunction in the context of asserted infringement of the
derivative works right has been analogized to the right of a landowner
to exclude trespassers. 199 This analogy is unavailing because, as
compared to all five of the other rights encompassed in the copyright
bundle, the right to exclude as applied to realty is a right to disallow
another from having control over or access to some particular
commodity. It is not, and has never been understood as, the right to
disallow another from having access to or control over a different
(though perhaps related) commodity. The preceding case comparison
demonstrated that the copyright owners in the cases concerning Gone
with the Wind and Catcher understood the derivative works right as
something other than a pecuniary right—something akin to the moral
right of integrity.
B.

What are Moral Rights?

The phrase “moral rights” refers to a suite of rights intended to
protect an author’s nonpecuniary interests in his or her creation. 200
196. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 353–57 (1989) (discussing the
issue from the perspective of transaction costs, among related
principles).
197. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich. L.
Rev. 1197, 1217 (1996) (“Landes and Posner argue that giving
derivative rights to the original owner reduces transaction costs by
requiring a publisher who wants to bring out a new translation of a
previously translated work to deal with only one copyright holder rather
than two. On this point, they are simply wrong. If the copyright in the
original did not extend to derivative works, the publisher of the
translation would not have to obtain the original author’s consent.”
(citing Landes & Posner, supra note 196)).
198. See supra Part III.
199. See supra note 92.
200. See Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Right, A Primer, 7
B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 41, 44 (1998) (describing moral rights and arguing
that theyprotect the integrity of the “creative process”).
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These rights include, but are not necessarily limited to, the rights of
attribution, disclosure, withdrawal, and integrity. 201 The right of
attribution is defined as the right to have one’s work identified as
such. 202 The right of disclosure is the right of an “author to determine
publication or nonpublication of his or her work.” 203 The limited right
of withdrawal is the right, recognized only rarely outside of France, to
retract a previously published work. 204 Finally, the right of integrity is
defined as “the right of authors to preserve their work from alteration,
mutilation, or even, in some circumstances, excessive criticism.” 205
One commentator stated that the right of integrity “recognizes the
work as an extension of the author’s personality.” 206 This right is said
to safeguard the author’s creative vision by guaranteeing the integrity
of his or her text. 207 This interest is demonstrably personal in nature,
and as a result, where the right is recognized, it is generally seen as
inalienable. 208

V. A Proposed Solution: Understanding the
Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right
If one accepts the proposition that an author ought to have the
right to protect the integrity of his or her work, as the copyright
owners in both Salinger and SunTrust asserted and as the trial courts
and the Second Circuit confirmed, there is no question that the
Copyright Act of 1976, while it may be contorted to address such a
claim, was not intended to do so. 209 The existing, expansive,
exclusive derivative works provision is unjustifiable as a utilitarian
mechanism. 210 The problems it presents for the freedom of expression
201. Id. at 46.
202. Settlemyer, supra note 71, at 2304.
203. Richard Fine, American Authorship and the Ghost of Moral Rights, 13
Book Hist. 218, 222 (2010).
204. Jeffrey M. Dine, Note, Authors’ Moral Rights in Non-European Nations:
International Agreements, Economics, Mannu Bhandari, And The Dead
Sea Scrolls, 16 Mich. J. Int’l L. 545, 551 (1995) (“The right of
withdrawal is the least exercised moral right. Its formal existence is rare
outside France and countries that derive their law from France.”).
205. Fine, supra note 203, at 223.
206. Heide, supra note 22, at 214.
207. Lior Zemer, Essay, Moral Rights: Limited Edition, 91 B.U. L. Rev.
1519, 1524 (2011).
208. Id. (“Due to the special connection between the author’s personality and
the work, civil law systems have traditionally regarded moral rights as
inalienable . . . .”).
209. Kwall, supra note 20, at 25–27.
210. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text.
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of secondary users cannot be justified by whatever minimal economic
incentive it provides to copyright holders. Repealing it and replacing
it with a more limited adaptation right subject to a compulsory
license would protect the pecuniary interests in adaptation. That
more limited right might mirror the exclusive adaptation right
delineated in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works: “Authors of literary or artistic works shall enjoy the
exclusive right of authorizing adaptations, arrangements and other
alterations of their works.” 211
A new § 106B aimed at protecting an author’s integrity right
would plainly state its intent and justification as the protection of an
author’s work from distortion, mutilation, or other modification which
is prejudicial to his or her reputation.
It is important to note that nothing in this proposal is intended to
deny copyright protection for derivative works. Derivative works
would continue to be protected to the same extent as provided for
under current law. 212 Copyright owners will still be able to create
derivatives, copyright those derivatives, and profit from them. All this
proposal aims to do is limit the exclusive right to create and license
derivative works, as broadly defined by the 1976 Act. The practical
effect of this change is that secondary users seeking to create
derivative works will not need the permission of the copyright owner
and will not be liable to the copyright owner who refuses to deal. In
fact, it will be possible for any party to create a derivative work upon
payment of the license fee so long as the limited right of integrity
represented by the new § 106B is not infringed.

211. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art.
12, July 24, 1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, Hein’s No. KAV 2245. Note
that Article 8 also provides for an exclusive right of translation. Id. art.
8.
212. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006):
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102
includes compilations and derivative works, but protection
for a work employing preexisting material in which
copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work
in which such material has been used unlawfully.
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends
only to the material contributed by the author of such
work, as distinguished from the preexisting material
employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive
right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such
work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the
scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright
protection in the preexisting material.
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A.

The Contours of the New Section 106B

Consider the fact that under current law, works created after
January 1, 1978 will be protected by copyright, including the
expansive derivative works right, for the life of the author plus
seventy years. 213 Under this formulation, the copyright in Catcher
would last until the end of 2080—nearly 130 years. Margaret Mitchell
died thirteen years after the publication of Gone with the Wind.
Consider the absurdity of the fact that the derivative works right has
subsisted in her estate for more than sixty years and will continue to
subsist in her estate for another twenty years. Likewise, for the next
thirty-five years, the derivative works right associated with Catcher
will be owned exclusively by Salinger’s heirs or the beneficiaries
named in his will. It is unfathomable that ownership of such a right
by the author’s next of kin or successors in interest encourages
innovation more than allowing the right to pass into the public
domain would. The new moral right proposed here would last for the
lifetime of the author, would not be transferable but would be
waivable, would not apply to works made for hire, and would be
subject to the fair use doctrine.
The contours of the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) are
instructive. 214 In 1990, Congress passed VARA to afford visual artists
certain “rights of attribution and integrity.” 215 For works created after
the effective date of VARA, the rights of attribution and integrity
created by VARA “endure for a term consisting of the life of the
author.” 216 VARA is the sole explicit recognition of moral rights in the
federal statutory scheme.
The limitation to the lifetime of the author is appropriate for the
same reason that the right created ought not to be transferable. That
is, as noted by Professor Kwall in her recent work The Soul of
Creativity, “[a]n author’s external work embodies her personal
meaning and intended message and thus is reflective of her individual,
intrinsic, creative process. No one, not even her spouse and children,
can substitute a personal judgment regarding the substance of the
author’s meaning and message.” 217 This is the basis for Kwall’s
assertion that “moral rights protection should expire upon the death
of the author.” 218 Moreover, limitation to the lifetime of the author
makes sense because once the author is deceased protection of his or
213. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
214. Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
215. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).
216. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1).
217. Kwall, supra note 20, at 160.
218. Id.
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her reputation is a nonissue. Finally, works made for hire should be
ineligible for protection under the new § 106B because the right
sought to be vindicated here, that is, the author’s right to maintain
the integrity of his or her work from distortion that would harm the
author’s reputation, is inherently personal. It would be anathema to
confer such a right on a corporate entity.
B.

Considering the Implications of the New Section 106B:
Hypothetical Resolutions of SunTrust and Salinger

Under the proposal made here, both SunTrust and Salinger would
have been resolved much more expeditiously. As an initial matter, the
plaintiff in SunTrust would not have had standing to bring its suit
because the right it would have had to rely upon would have expired
upon Mitchell’s death. Even if suit were brought, no claim would lie
under the Copyright Act, and the copyright owner would be left to
resort to claims of trademark infringement. 219 Likewise, in Salinger,
the author would have had a claim that likely would have settled
early in recognition of the right imbued by § 106B, or it would have
expired upon Salinger’s death. 220

Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Golan v. Holder all but
forecloses First Amendment arguments in the context of copyright.
This leaves alleged infringers to resort to arguments based upon fair
use. The case comparison undertaken here illustrates the
unpredictability inherent in proceeding under the fair use banner. The
cases concerning Gone with the Wind and Catcher are factually
similar and yet come to very different ends. This Article suggests that
one reason for this disparity is that the interest often sought to be
vindicated by copyright owners under the guise of the derivative
works right is personal rather than pecuniary. With that in mind, the
Article proposes that Congress repeal the existing § 106(2) and
replace it with a limited adaptation right subject to a compulsory
license and a moral right of integrity. This would introduce
transparency, disallow successors in interest from refusing to deal, and

219. SunTrust Complaint, supra note 42, at 15–17.
220. J.D. Salinger died while the Appeal to the Second Circuit was pending.
See Salinger v. Colting (Salinger II ), 607 F.3d 68, 70 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“We note that Plaintiff-Appellee J.D. Salinger died during the
pendency of this appeal. In a February 18, 2010 order, we granted the
motion of Colleen M. Salinger and Matthew R. Salinger, trustees of the
J.D. Salinger Literary Trust, to be substituted for Salinger as Appellees.
For reasons of convenience, however, we will continue to refer to
Salinger as ‘Plaintiff’ or ‘Appellee’ in this opinion.”).

552

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right

have the added benefit of reining copyright in by reference to its
constitutional and historical background.
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